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Introduction
Many people feel a need to serve the public interest or to increase the wellbeing of others, even of complete strangers. Andreoni and Miller (2002) study such altruistic preferences in the lab and …nd that a majority of people are willing to spend some money (anonymously) in order to increase the well-being of unknown others. 1 In practice, two common ways of serving the public interest are making a donation to charity and taking a job that involves helping others. Both these altruistic behaviors are prevalent in modern societies. List and Price (2012) report data showing that in rich countries typically more than half of the population make donations to charity. Data from the International Social Survey (2005) suggest that a sizeable majority of people aspire -and many of them have -a job in which they can increase the well-being of others.
In this paper we develop a coherent framework to study the role of altruistic preferences in job choice, on-the-job e¤ort provision, and charitable donations. We set up a simple theoretical model, and subsequently test the model's predictions using rich survey data. In our model, people di¤er in their altruism and can serve the public interest in two ways: by making a charitable donation and by taking a public service job and exerting e¤ort on the job. People make three decisions: whether to take a public service job or a regular job, how much e¤ort to exert at work, and how much of their income to donate to charity.
Our theoretical analysis yields the following predictions. First, as in related models that we discuss below, the likelihood of having a public service job (weakly) increases in a worker's altruism. The reason is that holding a public service job gives opportunities to contribute to the well-being of others at relatively low cost, which is appreciated by -and hence attractsaltruistic workers. Second, and quite naturally, for a given job type, charitable donations (weakly) increase in workers'altruism. Third, and perhaps more surprising, for a given altruism and income, workers holding a regular job donate more to charity than workers holding a public service job. The intuition behind this result is that public service workers already contribute to the well-being of others by exerting e¤ort on the job and, hence, by a substitution argument, they donate less.
Our study is related to a rapidly expanding theoretical literature in eco- Dur and Zoutenbier (2015) , Manna (2015) , Cassar (2016a) , and Barigozzi and Burani (2016) . In many of these studies, intrinsic motivation takes the form of altruism. We enrich this literature by allowing workers to serve the public interest in several ways -not only by exerting e¤ort on certain types of jobs, but also by making charitable donations. Our theoretical predictions point to a possible ‡aw in the empirical literature. Numerous public administration scholars and several economists have examined whether workers in some sectors or job types are more altruistic than in others (see Perry et al. 2010 and Perry and Vandenabeele 2015 for overviews). Many of these studies measure a worker's altruistic preferences using data on the worker's behavior outside the workplace, among others on the worker's donations to charity (e.g. . Our theory suggests that this measure is ‡awed and leads to an underestimation of altruism of workers in public service jobs. Indeed, our theory does not rule out that workers in public service jobs on average donate less to charity than workers in regular jobs do, and yet are more altruistic. This is particularly likely when public service jobs o¤er ample opportunities to serve the public interest, such that workers in those jobs feel less of a need to make further contributions outside the workplace. 2 We empirically examine our predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative longitudinal study covering 30,000 persons in 11,000 households. It contains questions about individual's education, earnings, employment, personality characteristics, and behavior. The key variables that we use for our analysis are self-reported altruism, money donations to charity, and job type or sector of employment. Following Becker et al. (2012) and Dur and Zoutenbier (2015) , we measure a worker's altruism by his response to the question: "How important do you …nd it to be there for others currently?"Donations to charity are measured by the response to the question: "Did you donate money last year (not counting membership fees)?" If the answer to this question is yes, the respondent is asked to report the total amount donated. Lastly, in line with the literature, we use several de…nitions of what a public service job exactly is. 3 Consistent with our theory, we …nd that workers who are more altruistic are more likely to take a public service job and, for a given job type, donate a higher amount to charity. Furthermore, we …nd that workers in a regular job make signi…cantly higher donations to charity than equally altruistic workers in a public service job. However, this di¤erence moves close to zero and becomes statistically insigni…cant when we control for income. Moreover, the result turns out to be sensitive to the exact de…nition of a public service job and the estimation method.
Studying workers'charitable behavior and self-selection into jobs is interesting in itself as well as relevant from a policy perspective. Studies like ours contribute to the body of knowledge about the prevalence of work motivations in di¤erent job types and sectors, which can be used when designing HR-policies. Moreover, as our study provides insights into the drivers of charitable donations, our results may be useful for charitable organizations in designing and targeting their promotion activities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop and analyze our theoretical model and derive predictions. In Section 3 we describe the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Theory

Model
We develop a model where workers take three decisions: they choose between a regular job (s = 0) and a public service job (s = 1), how much e¤ort to exert on the job (e s;i 0), and how much of their income to donate to charity (d s;i 0). Workers are heterogeneous in two ways. First, they di¤er in their altruism denoted by i . We assume altruism is impure, as in Andreoni (1990) . That is, a worker receives a 'warm-glow'utility from making a contribution to the well-being of others, but he does not directly care about other's utility. This approach is in line with earlier related models such as Besley and Ghatak (2005) , Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) , Dur and Zoutenbier (2015) , and Aldashev et al. (2016) . 4 Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2010) provide …eld-experimental evidence supporting this assumption. The altruism parameter i follows a continuous uniform distribution with boundaries [0; ] with > 0. Second, workers di¤er in a …xed bene…t (or cost) from choosing a public service job, denoted by " i . This variable is meant to represent worker i's preference for job aspects other than those stressed by our theory, such as commuting time, pension plans, and other job (dis)amenities. " i is drawn from a continuous uniform distribution with boundaries ["; "] where " < 0 < ". We shall assume a su¢ ciently rich type space (su¢ ciently low " and su¢ ciently high "), so that in equilibrium any possible altruism type i is present in both types of jobs.
A worker's utility depends on his private consumption, on his cost of e¤ort, the …xed bene…t or cost " i when working in a public service job (s = 1), and -if the worker is altruistic ( i > 0) -on his contribution to the wellbeing of others. More speci…cally, we assume that worker i's utility increases linearly in his private consumption, that his e¤ort costs are quadratic, and that his 'altruistic utility'is log-linear in his contributions to the well-being of others:
where w s;i denotes worker i's wage when working in sector s, private consumption is the di¤erence between the worker's wage (w s;i ) and his donation to charity (d s;i 0), the parameter is a measure for the cost of e¤ort, and s is the e¤ect of a unit of e¤ort in job s on the well-being of others. For simplicity, we assume 0 = 0 and 1 > 0. That is, only e¤ort in a public service job increases the well-being of others, while e¤ort in a regular job does not. However, our key predictions are similar if on-the-job e¤ort would increase the well-being of others in all jobs but more so in public service jobs. Besides exerting e¤ort in a public service job, workers can serve the public interest by donating money to charity, and we assume that these two instruments are substitutes. For convenience, we assume that they are perfect substitutes. 6 Furthermore, we assume that workers are paid for performance in regular jobs, while workers receive a ‡at wage in a public service job. More precisely, wages in regular and public service jobs equal w 0 = a + xe 0 and w 1 = z, respectively, where x equals the marginal product of e¤ort of workers in a regular job (assuming perfect competition in the labor market) and z is such that the demand for public services equals the supply of those services provided by workers in public service jobs in equilibrium. The assumption of ‡at wages in public service jobs is in line with the stylized fact that pay is typically less dependent on performance in those jobs. 7 Our key predictions need not change if we allow for performance pay in all jobs.
The timing of the events is as follows. First, nature draws each worker's i and " i . Second, workers choose either a regular or a public service job. Finally, workers choose their e¤ort and donations.
Analysis
We solve the model by backward induction and …rst derive the on-the-job e¤ort and charitable donations a worker chooses for a given job type. Next, we will analyze which worker types, in terms of i and " i , sort into which job type. Along the way, we will formulate predictions that will be empirically examined in Section 4.
If worker i has a regular job (s = 0), his optimization problem reads Optimal e¤ort e 0;i 0 and optimal donations d 0;i 0, are found by simultaneously solving the following …rst-order conditions:
which results in:
Hence, workers with a regular job all exert the same level of e¤ort, independent of their altruistic preferences. Altruistic workers with a regular job donate a part of their income to charity, and the more so the stronger their altruistic preferences. Sel…sh workers (those with i = 0) would like to extract money from charities (d 0;i < 0), but the non-negativity constraint naturally prevents this, and so their donations equal zero.
If worker i has a public service job, his optimization problem reads
Optimal e¤ort e 1;i 0 and optimal charitable donations d 1;i 0 are found by simultaneously solving the …rst-order conditions: 
Clearly, not all of the altruistic workers in a public service job make donations to charity. Those with altruism lower than or equal to 2 1 = only exert e¤ort and do not supplement it by making charitable donations. The reason for this is that, up to some point, exerting e¤ort on the job is a less costly way to serve the public interest than making charitable donations. Consequently, workers with relatively low levels of altruism will only make use of this less costly instrument, and the more so, the more altruistic the worker is. When work e¤ort reaches a critical level, making charitable donations becomes the less costly option at the margin. As a result, workers whose altruism is higher than 2 1 = use both e¤ort and donations to serve the public interest. Note that starting at the treshold level of altruism of 2 1 = , higher altruism results in an increase in donations, while e¤ort remains the same. Thus, as compared to models where people can only serve the public interest through on-the-job e¤ort, we …nd that adding the option to make charitable donations truncates e¤ort for public service jobs. Note that the level at which e¤ort is truncated critically depends on the e¤ectiveness of e¤ort as compared to that of charitable donations, as measured by 1 . Clearly, when on-the-job e¤ort is more e¤ective in raising the well-being of others, e¤ort plays a bigger role at the expense of charitable donations. Lastly, note that (2), (3), and (4) imply that, for a given altruism, a worker's charitable donations are always higher when holding a regular job as compared to holding a public service job. The reverse holds, however, for total contributions to the public interest (d + e) for workers with altruism smaller than 2 1 = . The intuition is that workers with a public service job can contribute to the public interest at a lower cost, and hence contribute more. For workers with altruism equal to or higher than 2 1 = , total contributions are similar across job types for a given level of altruism. The reason is that, for those workers, the marginal costs of charitable donations drives their total contribution, which is independent of job type.
The choices that workers make are depicted in Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1 ]
In Section 4, we will empirically examine the following predictions regarding worker's charitable donations:
We shall examine whether these predictions …nd support in the data, with and without controlling for worker's income in the regressions. Now that we have analyzed the behavior of workers in a given job type, we examine which worker types sort into which job type. Substituting (1) and (2) into the utility function gives, after some rewriting, the utility derived from taking a regular job:
Workers taking a public service job attain utility:
which follows from substituting (3) and (4) into the utility function. Comparing the utilities attained in a regular and public service job, it follows that workers with i 2 1 = choose a public service job if: z a 1 2
There is an interior solution for any possible -type if " is su¢ ciently large and " is su¢ ciently low. It is also straightforward to derive that the left-hand side of the inequality increases with i . Hence, for workers whose altruism is smaller than or equal to 2 1 = , it holds that those with stronger altruistic 8 preferences are more likely to choose a public service job. The intuition is that a public service job o¤ers an opportunity to serve the public interest at a relatively low cost, which is more attractive for workers with stronger altruistic preferences as they make more use of it. For workers with i > 2 1 = , we …nd that they prefer a public service job if:
Hence, for these highly altruistic workers, the attractiveness of a public service job does not increase with the worker's altruism. The reason is that all workers within this group use the opportunity to serve the public interest on the job to the same extent, see equation (4) above. Hence, the probability of choosing a public service job does not further increase with altruism starting at i = [ Figure 2] In equilibrium, the wage for public service jobs z will be such that supply of and demand for services are equal:
where "( ) is the relation resulting from condition (5) holding with equality, f ("; ) is the probability density function, and D represents the demand for public services measured in units of e¤ort (which may well depend on the cost per unit, but is assumed to be constant here for convenience). Without loss of generality, we assume a mass of workers equal to unity. Note that when z goes up, "( ) goes down, implying an increase in supply.
The prediction that will be studied in the next sections resulting from the analysis of job choice above is: Prediction 3: Workers who are more altruistic are (weakly) more likely to choose a public service job.
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We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). 8 The SOEP is an unbalanced panel which contains survey questions about employment, earnings, preferences, and personality measures among others (see Wagner et al. 2007 ). Our key variables of interest are self-reported monetary donations to charity, altruistic preferences, and job type or sector of employment. We measure charitable donations by the response to the question: "Did you donate money last year (not counting membership fees)?" 9 The respondents who answered this question with "yes" were subsequently asked how much money they donated in total. Following Becker et al. (2012) and Dur and Zoutenbier (2015) , we measure altruistic preferences by the respondent's answer to the question: "How important are the following things [being there for others] currently for you?" Answers are given on a four point scale, ranging from "not at all important" to "very important". Finally, we allow for two distinct de…nitions of what regular and public service jobs are. We start with de…ning public service jobs as jobs in the public sector and regular jobs as jobs in the private sector. 10 Next, we de…ne public service jobs as jobs in certain industries (health, sport and education, and public administration) and regular jobs as jobs in the remaining industries. We exclude all people without a job from our sample.
One may be sceptical about the reliability of the questionnaire data we use, particularly about the self-reported altruistic preferences and donations. For instance, it might well be that people paint a too rosy picture of their altruistic preferences and their generosity. Even worse, such misrepresentation may correlate with job type. Recent …ndings from an incentivized experiment by Abeler et al. (2014) , however, suggest that we should not be too sceptical about self-reported data. They …nd among a representative sample of the German population that participants forego considerable amounts of money to avoid lying. 11 Moreover, lying appears to be uncorrelated with sector of employment (personal communication with Johannes Abeler). Relatedly, Falk et al. (2016) examine the predictive power of survey questions for incentivized choices and …nd a sizeable correlation of 0.4 between stated and revealed willingness to donate part of a windfall gain to a charity. We restrict our analysis to the year 2010, because this is the only year in which the question about charitable donations is included in the survey. The question that measures a respondent's altruism is taken from the 2008 wave, which is the most recent wave that includes this question. We have a sample of 7,527 respondents of which 26.2% is employed in the public sector and the remaining 73.8% is employed in the private sector (the corresponding …gures for the alternative de…nition of a public service job are 33.0% and 67.0%).
To examine whether there is support for our predictions, we run an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with money donations to charity as the dependent variable. 12 Our main speci…cation is:
where C is the amount of charitable donations, A is a worker's self-reported altruism, S is a dummy variable that equals one if a worker has a public service job, I is worker's income, X is a vector of other control variables, and is the residual. In line with theoretical predictions 1 and 2, we expect that an increase in altruism leads to an increase in donations ( > 0) and that, for a given altruism, having a public service job instead of a regular job decreases donations ( < 0). While our theoretical model abstracts from income e¤ects, we allow for those in the empirical analysis by including the worker's income. To examine theoretical prediction 3 regarding the altruism of workers with a public service job, we estimate the following regression equation:
where S is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker has a public service job, A is the worker's altruism, Z is a vector of other control variables, and ! is the residual. In line with theoretical prediction 3 we expect that workers' probability to sort into a public service job increases in altruism ( > 0). The speci…cation we estimate is identical to Dur and Zoutenbier (2015) who people lie surprisingly little.study the same issue using an earlier wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel.
In Table 1 we display the descriptive statistics of our sample. Since in most of our empirical analysis we compare public sector workers with private sector workers, we distinguish between these two in the descriptive statistics as well. There are several striking di¤erences between public and private sector workers. For instance, the average donation made by public sector workers is 121.95 euros, while private sector workers on average donate 107.37 euros. There is quite a bit of variation in donations in both sectors. Public sector workers report to be more altruistic than private sector workers, though the di¤erence in the average is small. Furthermore, public sector workers are on average older, are more often female, and are much higher educated than private sector workers. Also, public sector workers earn on average a higher yearly income, while the standard deviation of their income is much lower than the standard deviation of incomes in the private sector. Table 2 shows the correlations between our variables of interest. Charitable donations and altruism are positively correlated and the same is true for charitable donations and public sector employment and for altruism and public sector employment. Figure 3 plots the average charitable donations by sector of employment and altruism. Charitable donations tend to increase with a worker's altruism. Moreover, it turns out that, for a given altruism, public sector workers on average donate more than private sector workers. 13 While this runs counter to our theoretical predictions, we should keep in mind that these are raw correlations, which do not control for important heterogeneity between public and private sector employees, among others in education, gender, and income. To control for these, we now turn to regression analysis.
[ Figure 3] Table 3 reports the results of regressing charitable donations (measured in euros) on a worker's altruism, sector of employment, and a rich set of demographics. We include altruism in the most ‡exible manner, i.e. we take up three dummies for altruism categories 1, 2, and 4, while category 3 -workers who answered they …nd it "important" to be there for others-forms the baseline category. We …nd evidence in line with predictions 1 and 2. That is, charitable donations increase with self-reported altruism and, for a given level of altruism, public sector workers donate signi…cantly less than private sector workers. The di¤erence is 32.51 euro, which is close to 30% of mean donations. The second column of Table 3 adds the worker's income as a control in a very ‡exible manner by taking up 10 dummies for income categories. The estimates show a positive convex relation between donations and income. More importantly, controlling for income moves the coe¢ cient for public sector employment close to zero. Clearly, without controlling for income, the public sector dummy picked up that workers in the public sector make smaller donations because they earn less than comparable others in the private sector. The coe¢ cient for the lowest altruism category also moves quite a bit, though we should keep in mind the very small number of observations in this category (see Table 1 ), implying imprecise estimates. Many of the other control variables have the same sign and are of similar size as compared to earlier studies. For example, highly educated workers donate more than lower educated workers (cf. Bekker and Wiepking 2011), though the di¤erence decreases with almost 40 percent when controlling for income. Contrary to earlier studies, we don't …nd that females donate more than males (cf. Mesch et al. 2006 ). However, we should keep in mind that, in contrast to earlier studies, our regressions control for self-reported altruism, which is strongly positively correlated with gender (see Table 2 ). Table 4 shows the same regressions using a di¤erent de…nition of a public service job, namely jobs in the health industry, sport and education industry, and public administration. 14 The results are qualitatively the same, even though the coe¢ cient for public service job is smaller and far from signi…cant even when we do not control for income.
Results
All our results so far are based on the full sample of workers. Motivated by Lewis and Frank (2002) , Buurman et al. (2012) , and Dur and Zoutenbier (2015) we replicated our results using a subsample of highly educated 14 The other industries are: Agriculture, Fisheries, Energy/Water, Mining, Chemicals, Synthetics, Earth/Clay/Stone, Iron/Steel, Mechanical Engineering, Electiral Engineering, Wood/Paper/Print, Clothing, Food, Construction, Wholesale, Trading Agents, Retail, Train System, Postal System, Other transport, Financial Institutions, Insurance, Restaurants, Service Industries, Trash Removal, Legal Services, Other Services, Church, Private Household.
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workers. The main reason for this is that it might be that highly educated workers have more on-the-job opportunities to serve the public interest than less educated workers. Our results are in line with this. We …nd that for the subsample of highly educated workers, working in the public sector goes hand in hand with a bigger drop in charitable donations, which remains substantial (but loses signi…cance) even when we control for income.
Lastly, we examine selection into type of job. Table 5 reports the results of a linear probability model similar to Dur and Zoutenbier (2015) , where the dependent variable in column 1 is employment in the public sector whereas the dependent variable in column 2 is holding a job in health, education, or public administration. In addition to altruism and the usual demographics, we follow Dur and Zoutenbier by including two other self-reported preference measures: laziness and risk aversion. In line with prediction 3, we …nd in column 1 that workers with stronger altruistic preferences are more likely to end up in the public sector, though the coe¢ cient is marginally insigni…cant (p=0.104). We …nd a much higher and signi…cant estimate when employing the alternative de…nition of a public service job, see column 2. For each point increase on the altruism scale, the likelihood of employment in health, education, or public administration increases by 3.3 percentage points, which is sizeable given the average likelihood of having such a job of 33.0%. These results as well as the other coe¢ cients are well in line with Dur and Zoutenbier (2015), who used an earlier wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel. It is worth noting that the coe¢ cient for the worker's laziness is marginally insigni…cant (p=0.109 and p=0.105, respectively).
Concluding remarks
We have studied the role of a worker's altruistic preferences in occupational choice, on-the-job e¤ort provision, and donations to charity. We developed a simple model producing three key predictions: 1) Given job type, workers with stronger altruistic preferences make higher donations to charity; 2) Given a worker's altruism, those working in a public service job donate less than workers in a regular job; and 3) Workers with stronger altruistic preferences are more likely to take a public service job. We examined data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study -which contains rich data on (self-reported) altruism, charitable donations, and job type -and found support for our predictions, though some results are sensitive to the exact de…nition of a public service job or the estimation method. Our analysis implies that we should be careful with using charitable donations as a proxy for altruistic preferences in studies that compare workers in di¤erent sectors. Indeed, our theory predicts and the evidence indicates that workers in public service jobs are more altruistic, and yet make smaller donations to charity than their empirical counterparts in regular jobs. The reason suggested by our theory is a simple substitution argument: Since workers in public service jobs serve the public interest on the job, they are less inclined to make substantial charitable donations.
In our theoretical model, workers di¤ered not only in altruism, but also in their preference for other job (dis)amenities speci…c to public service jobs, such as job protection or ‡exible working hours. In future work, we wish to study how the provision of these (dis)amenities a¤ects the self-selection of worker types to public service jobs. Regarding empirical work, it would be interesting to follow workers over time, in particular when they switch job types for plausibly exogenous reasons, or experience a change in the mission of the organization they work for (as in Zoutenbier 2016) . The release of the next wave of the SOEP may provide opportunities to do so. The lab may also provide a useful test bed for more directly testing the substitutability between on-the-job contributions to society and charitable donations (see e.g. 
